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Poland
Security through Diversity
Jerzy Hausner
The program for pension system reform launched at the beginning of 1997
in Poland was called by its authors “Security through Diversity” (Security
1997). This title emphasizes that pension reform—which is designed to
guarantee security for the insured—must combine a ﬁrst, pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO) pillar; a second, mandatory, fully funded pillar; and a third, vol-
untary, funded pillar.
The beginnings of the pension system in Poland go back to the interwar
period. It became a full-ﬂedged universal PAYGO system in the 1950s.
Since that time, the way it operates has not fundamentally changed. In the
1980s, the system came to cover the rural population as well. Each new
measure, especially those adopted between the 1960s and the 1980s, in-
volved granting additional privileges to diﬀerent occupational groups.
Nonetheless, until the end of the 1980s the system operated in relative
ﬁnancial equilibrium. This was possible due to—among other things—the
gradual rise in the contribution rate. In the 1950s, it amounted to 15 per-
cent of gross earnings, but by the end of the 1980s it had reached a level
of 38 percent.
The ﬁnancial insolvency of the PAYGO pension system in Poland is
attributable to three sets of factors: those that are typical of modern socie-
ties in general and that are basically independent of the type of economic
system; those that are speciﬁc to socialist and post-socialist societies; and
those that are speciﬁc to Poland.
With respect to the ﬁrst set of factors, society’s aging, caused among
other things by a fall in the birth rate and a rise in average life expectancy,
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349has increased pressure on the system. Demographic waves, caused by pop-
ulation losses in World War II and the postwar demographic boom, also
have created growing diﬃculties over time.
The ratio of pensioners to the working population, that is, the demo-
graphic dependency ratio (DDR), stood at 20.6 percent in 1985. Since that
time it has increased, reaching approximately 23.8 percent around the year
2000. In the years 2000–05, the situation will improve slightly as increasing
numbers of children of parents born during the postwar demographic
boom reach working age. The coeﬃcient will fall as a result to 23.1 per-
cent. Then, however, those born during the postwar baby boom will them-
selves reach retirement age, after which the demographic dependency ratio
will rise sharply, reaching 33.9 percent in 2020. In 1990, for every one
person of retirement age there were 2.2 working persons. In 2005 this ﬁg-
ure will be 2.1, but in 2020 it will fall to 1.8.
What this shows is that, compared to Western European societies in
particular, the pressure of demographic factors is for the moment neither
a major cause of tension in the Polish pension system, nor a major reason
for its reform.
The main problem inherited from the socialist system is the pressure of
branch interest groups characteristic of such economies. It is often said
that a PAYGO system is susceptible to political pressures and bargaining.
In socialist systems, where certain occupational branch groups (mainly
in mining and heavy industry) gain excessive inﬂuence, this problem is
particularly acute.
Among the factors speciﬁc to Poland are protection of the purchasing
power of pensions during the transitional recession; the policy of ﬁghting
unemployment by facilitating early retirement; and lax legislation and en-
titlement regulations for disability status. The eﬀect of all the causal fac-
tors mentioned above has been an increase in the total number of persons
receiving pension beneﬁts in the 1990s. In 1996, this ﬁgure was nearly 30
percent higher than at the end of the 1980s. On the other hand, between
1989 and 1996, the number of people employed and paying contributions
dropped by 14.4 percent (Mu ¨ller 1999, 5).
As a result, the ratio of persons receiving social insurance beneﬁts to
persons paying insurance contributions (the system dependency ratio
[SDR]) has steadily increased. In 1995, the value of the SDR exceeded the
value of the DDR by close to 40 percent. Poland’s pension system was
thus under severe strain and contributions have risen. At the beginning of
the 1990s, the contribution rate was raised to 45 percent (31 percent ac-
cording to net calculation), which means that Poland has one of the highest
rates in the world—a fact that, owing to the country’s unusually high indi-
rect labor costs, is undermining the competitiveness of the economy. De-
spite the huge level of contributions, the Polish pension system is charac-
350 Jerzy Hausnerterized by an especially high implicit pension debt1: approximately 220
percent of gross domestic product (GDP), signiﬁcantly higher than in
other transition economies (James 1998).
The general ﬁnancial eﬀect of the causal factors discussed above has
been a dramatic increase in expenditure on pension beneﬁts as a share of
GDP (table 11.1). In the years from 1989 to 1995, it more than doubled.
This will, of course, prevent any major increase in spending on other social
services and investment in human capital, particularly because—despite
the rise in the contribution rate—the social insurance system began to
record a considerable deﬁcit in the 1990s, which must be ﬁnanced from
budget subsidies.
Since the beginning of the transition there has been a growing awareness
among experts and politicians of the need to reform the social insurance
system. The ﬁrst plans for a radical overhaul of the PAYGO system and
the introduction of a funded insurance component appeared in the early
1990s. At the time, however, politicians did not give these plans due con-
sideration.
If, then, they have in the end embraced reform, it is because it has
proved diﬃcult, ineﬀective, and ultimately impossible to carry out short-
term preventive measures.
The rapid growth in expenditure on pension beneﬁts, as well as the need
to subsidize them heavily, put pressure on decision makers. The mecha-
nism of backward-looking wage indexation for these beneﬁts meant that,
periodically, ﬁnancial pressure sharply increased. This was reﬂected,
above all, in the inability to prepare a budget that would avoid the dra-
matic choice between a huge rise in the budget deﬁcit—thus undermining
macroeconomic stability and reversing disinﬂationary trends—and major
cuts in expenditure on important social and economic goals. The success-
Table 11.1 Expenditure on Disability and Retirement Pensions in 1990–96, and State
Subsidies to Social Insurance Funds (FUS, KRUS) (as a percentage of GDP)
Item 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Retirement and disability pensions 8.6 12.6 14.6 14.2 15.8 15.6 15.2
Social Insurance Fund (FUS)
subsidy — 2.9 4.3 4.2 3.9 2.1 1.9
Farmers’ Social Insurance Fund
(KRUS) subsidy — 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.2
Source: Author’s calculations based on Hausner (1998), 25, and UNDP (1997), 132.
Notes: Long dashes in columns indicate that the funds were not subsidized during that year.
1. The present value of the pension promises that are owed to current pensioners and
workers because of their participation in the old system (James 1998, 459).
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meant that in practice there was no choice. From time to time it became
necessary to weaken the beneﬁt indexation mechanism. With the help of
supplementary budget legislation, it was technically possible to limit the
expected rise in retirement and disability pensions.
Such a course of action was, of course, opposed by pensioners and their
representatives; it accordingly became a major political burden. This also
explains the sharp fall in support for the post-Solidarity governments, and
their eventual collapse in 1993.
The post-communist opposition, which won the elections while promis-
ing, among other things, a return to “fair” beneﬁts, faced not only the
same diﬃculties as before, but also new ones: The public protests had
been accompanied by formal appeals to the Constitutional Tribunal. On
numerous occasions the tribunal ruled in favor of those who had ques-
tioned the amended regulations. The new parliamentary majority could
have formally overruled the verdicts of the tribunal, but in most cases it
did not, feeling bound by its election promises. Thus the verdicts of the
tribunal came into force, which led to an increase in ﬁnancial pressure.
The state’s unpaid debts to pensioners rapidly grew, and came to form a
signiﬁcant portion of public debt.
In its rulings, the Constitutional Tribunal consistently recognized as un-
constitutional the practice of periodically and temporarily suspending a
portion of the state’s commitments to pensioners for ﬁscal reasons. At the
same time, it clearly stressed that this did not preclude the possibility of a
permanent systemic change in the regulations, provided that such a change
was preceded by appropriate legislation.
Thus, it was only when legal and political factors prevented ad hoc ma-
nipulation of the pension system that the warnings of experts and the idea
of major reform came to be taken seriously.
Under the circumstances, a radical program for pension system reform
in Poland had to be devised and implemented. It was based on the follow-
ing principles:
1. Full security. The program must provide all age groups—pensioners
(the grandparents’ generation), long-time employees (the parents’ gener-
ation), and beginning or prospective employees (the children’s genera-
tion)—with a guarantee of economic security on termination of their
working lives or in the case of inability to work.
2. Protection of acquired rights. Beneﬁts acquired prior to the moment
the appropriate new legislation takes eﬀect must retain their real value—
under the conditions of economic growth—for the rest of the holders’ life-
times, and will be paid in accordance with previous principles. Thus, the
reform does not apply to today’s pensioners.
3. Individual prudence. One of the foundations of the system’s security
352 Jerzy Hausnerwill be individual prudence, manifested through deliberate investment in
the form of appropriate social insurance contributions that will translate
into one’s own future pension or disability beneﬁts.
4. A multisegment structure of the pension system. High security of the
system of pensions and disability beneﬁts will result from its being based
on three main pillars: PAYGO, funded, and voluntary insurance.
5. Maximum freedom of choice. Payment of the insurance contribution
will be mandatory, as it is now, but one will be able to choose the pension
fund in which to entrust one’s savings, and it will be relatively easy to
transfer saving from one fund to another. In addition, one will be able to
decide (within certain margins) about the date of one’s retirement.
6. Transparency. This will be ensured by the introduction of a universal
system of individual social insurance records and accounts. In addition,
pension funds must be obliged by law to publish information about their
ﬁnancial results.
7. An active (regulatory) role of the state. By regulating the functioning
of the capital market and, in particular, supervising the operation of pen-
sion funds, the state should guarantee full security of the pension system.
8. Sustainable and balanced economic growth. The new system of pen-
sions will utilize mechanisms of secure investment of funds.
These principles formed the basis for the introduction of the relevant
legislation, which was adopted in two packages by two politically diﬀerent
governments and parliaments. The ﬁrst package, submitted to Parliament
in April 1997 by the center-left coalition (SLD-PSL), comprised:2
1. The Law (of 28 August 1997) on the Organization and Operation of
Pension Funds,
2. The Law (of 22 August 1997) on Employee Pension Programs, and
3. The Law (of 25 June 1997) on Applying the Revenues from Privatiza-
tion of a Portion of State Treasury Assets for Purposes Connected with
Reforming the Social Insurance System.
The package speciﬁes how revenue from privatization will be used to
bridge the growing ﬁnancial gap that has appeared in the present PAYGO
pension system. In addition, it initiates reform of this system, and launches
a second (mandatory) and develops a third (voluntary) funded pillar of
pension insurance. It also fully regulates the organization and operation
of second-pillar pension funds as well as the state’s administrative supervi-
sion of their activities. Moreover, it lays down the rules determining how
employee pension schemes—an entirely new and prospectively dominant
form of voluntary, fully funded insurance—are to be set up and run.
2. “SLD” is the Soljusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, or the Democratic Left Alliance Party;
“PSL” is the Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, or Polish Peasants’ Party. For a detailed analysis
of the work on pension reform during the SLD-PSL government, see Hausner 1998.
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in April 1998 by the center-right coalition (AWS-UW),3 comprised:
1. The Law (of 13 October 1998) on the Social Insurance System, and
2. The Law (of 18 December 1998) on the new PAYGO pensions from
the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS).
These laws specify the operation of the new ﬁrst pillar and the ZUS, as
well as the transition path from the old to the new pension system.
The new pension system in Poland was introduced on 1 January 1999,
with changes to the PAYGO pillar. The launching of the second pillar was
postponed until 1 April 1999 for technical reasons. The ﬁrst pillar
(PAYGO) retains ﬁve-eighths of the obligatory pension contribution (12.22
percent of gross wages). Although it remains a repartition-based scheme,
its operation is governed by the principle of deﬁned contribution (DC). The
remaining three-eighths (7.30 percent of gross wages) of the contribution
goes to the second (fully funded) pillar, composed of privately managed
pension funds and also based on the DC principle. These two pillars make
up the mandatory segment of the general pension system and are closely
interconnected. All participants in the general pension system have their
contributions and beneﬁts calculated in accordance with the same rules.
The amount of beneﬁt depends exclusively—in the ﬁrst pillar—on the ag-
gregate amount of one’s contributions (recorded in the individual notional
account of every participant), the uniform rules of indexation, and one’s
age at retirement; and—in the second pillar—on the aggregate amount of
contributions (likewise entered into individual capital accounts) and the
eﬃciency of the investment strategy of a given fund. Payment of a mini-
mum pension is guaranteed by the state to all participants in the general
system (this can be seen as a kind of “zero pillar”). Participation in the
third (funded) pillar is voluntary. The law allows for a variety of organiza-
tional forms and types of pension schemes in this segment.
Participation in the new general pension system is mandatory for all
employed persons born after 1969 (i.e., aged under thirty). Persons born
between 1949 and 1969 (aged from thirty to ﬁfty) could choose between
the “old” (exclusively reformed PAYGO) and the “new” system. Persons
over the age of ﬁfty were not allowed such a choice and must continue
under the old system. The rules for calculating beneﬁts will be unchanged
for those retiring through 2006 (Chlon, Go ´ra, and Rutkowski 1999, 15).
The new principles do not apply in any way to persons who acquired pen-
sion beneﬁts before the reform was launched.
Entitlements to pension beneﬁts acquired under the previous system will
be converted—for all participants to whom the new arrangements apply—
3. “AWS” is the Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnos ´c ´ (Solidarity Electoral Alliance); UW is the
Unia Wolnos ´ci (Freedom Union).
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transferred from the state budget for periods of national military service,
nursing a disabled child, and parental leave. The Labor Fund covers peri-
ods of unemployment. These transfers are estimated at a level of 0.2–0.3
percent of GDP annually (Chlon, Go ´ra, and Rutkowski 1999, 19).
In order to relieve pressure on the ﬁrst pillar caused by demographic
waves, a demographic reserve fund has been established. It will encompass
any surplus in the ﬁrst pillar plus one percentage point of the wage bill
(about 0.35 percent of GDP) transferred to the fund in years 2002–08. The
demographic reserve fund will invest its resources, and any interest or extra
revenues will be added to the fund. It is estimated that the fund will ac-
count for approximately 14 percent of GDP by the year 2020 (Chlon,
Go ´ra, and Rutkowski 1999, 24).
Persons under the age of thirty, for whom participation in the new sys-
tem is mandatory, had to choose their pension funds (within the second
pillar) by 30 September 1999. If they did not make a choice, pension funds
were assigned to them randomly by the Pension Fund Supervisory Board.
Persons aged thirty to ﬁfty could chose whether to switch to the new sys-
tem. If they did so, they had to select their pension funds by 31 Decem-
ber 1999.
According to initial estimates, between 6 and 7 million participants were
to enter the new general system (ﬁrst and second pillars). The total pos-
sible number of entrants was 11.5 million, including 3.8 million born after
1968 (aged under thirty) and 7.7 million born in the years 1949–68 (thirty-
to ﬁfty-year-olds). By the end of 1999, 10.5 million people had joined
the system, each choosing one of the twenty-one registered pension funds.
Certainly, some of the agreements signed will turn out to be invalid (double
agreements, forged agreements, agreements signed with persons not en-
titled to sign them). It is estimated that, on average, 15 percent of the
agreements in the portfolio of each pension fund may be invalid. This has
not decreased the considerable level of public interest in joining pension
funds or the perceived success of the reform.
However, the situation of the various pension funds is highly diverse.
Three are clearly dominant on the market: Commercial Union, Nationale
Nederlanden, and Złota Jesien ´–PZU (see table 11.2). These are funds
managed by insurance companies that have existed on the Polish market
for at least a few years and that had a large network of experienced can-
vassers the moment they began recruiting. The clear losers have been the
banks, who, with no such network at their disposal, have tried to attract
clients through their local branches.
Thus, after the initial formation period, the level of concentration on
the pension fund market—measured by the number of members and
assets—is very high. The number of actual funds is also large, but many
are too small to survive. Therefore, the trend toward rapid consolidation
Poland: Security through Diversity 355on the market seems only natural. The companies managing the pension
funds are in favor of such consolidation, although it is opposed—for the
moment, only informally—by the Pension Fund Supervisory Board
(Urza ˛d Nadzoru Funduszy Emerytalnych, or UNFE). The board has also
stated publicly that in its opinion concentration on the market is excessive.
At the beginning of 2000, it published a controversial report for the gov-
ernment, in which it gave a negative assessment of the situation on the
pension fund market and suggested amendments to the legislation regulat-
ing pension funds. The purpose of this was to slow down the consolidation
process and to enable the high level of concentration to be restricted
through administrative means. The board’s proposal was ﬁercely opposed
by those responsible for preparing and implementing reform of the pen-
sion system as well as by the companies concerned. Its authors were ac-
cused of trying to steer the market manually and hinder the free interplay
of market forces.
Pension funds (in the second pillar) are required by law to diversify their
investment portfolios. The ceilings for particular types of investment are
as follows: shares in companies quoted on the stock exchange, 40 percent;
foreign assets, 5 percent; secondary market securities, 10 percent; National
Table 11.2 Ranking of Pension Funds (end of 1999)
Rank by Value of Value of Assets Market Number of
Contributions (in millions Share Members
(end of 1999) of zlotys) (%) ( 1,000)
1. Commercial Union 678.9 30.2 2 million 300
2. Nationale Nederlanden 478.2 21.3 1 million 600
3. Złota Jesien ´–PZU 360.2 16.0 1 million 900
4. AIG 178.6 8.0 850
5. Zurich Solidarni 96.9 4.3 455
6. Norwich Union 75.5 3.4 565
7. Bankowy 74.9 3.3 390
8. Skarbiec-Emerytura 58.1 2.6 390
9. Winterthur 50.7 2.3 300
10. Ego 34.4 1.5 286
11. Orzeł 32.3 1.4 328
12. Dom 31.8 1.4 250
13. Allianz 30.5 1.3 197
14. Pocztylion 27.9 1.2 393
15. Pioneer 13.9 150
16. Pekao Alliance 10.0 70
17. Arka-Invesco 5.2 80
18. Epoka 3.2 100
19. Polsat 2.9 160
20. Kredyt Bank 1.6 90
21. Rodzina 0.2 75
Source: Polityka (2000).
356 Jerzy HausnerInvestment Funds, 10 percent; and bonds issued by local governments, 15
percent. The actual structure of pension fund assets at the beginning of
2000 is illustrated in table 11.3.
The pension companies that manage pension funds have strongly
emphasized a need that investment discipline, imposed on them by legisla-
tors, be eased. They believe that this would ensure a signiﬁcantly higher
rate of return, and in future a higher level of pensions. Their demands
usually concern raising the ceiling on foreign investment and allowing in-
vestment on the real estate market. Of the opposite opinion is the UNFE,
which has suggested the complete elimination of foreign investment.
UNFE representatives justify this primarily by the need to ensure market
security and to protect the saving of members of pension funds.
It should be stressed that the clear motive for reform of the Polish sys-
tem is a desire to reduce the very high replacement rate (over 60 percent;
Table 11.3 The Structure of Pension Fund Assets (end of January 2000)
Bonds Issued Bank Assets National
by Treasury and by Deposits at the end Investment
Fund Name National Bank of Poland and Securities of January Funds
AIG 66.76 3.11 24.99
Allianz 79.10 0.30 18.40
Arka-Invesco 70.00 0.26 29.57
Bankowy 58.20 1.14 31.14
Commercial Union 64.88 34.27
DOM 53.66 37.39 6.98
Ego 71.53 4.46 21.21 1.39
Epoka 84.40 9.72
Kredyt Banku 77.30 8.11 8.11
Nationale-
Nederlanden 64.41 4.96 30.43
Norwich Union 74.06 0.22 23.03
PBK Orzeł 64.98 1.81 25.98
Pekao/Alliance 56.37 5.20 36.44
Pioneer 49.92 1.80 38.69 9.43
Pocztylion 66.12 0.88 31.32
Polsat 58.51 2.67 33.86 2.45
PZU Złota Jesien ´ 65.66 0.20 33.42
Rodzina 69.52 4.70 18.82
Skarbiec-Emerytura 66.12 6.88 20.00
Winterthur 66.37 0.35 28.85
Zurich Solidarni 76.04 0.02 23.71
Total Weighted average: 30.50
Source: Rzeczpospolita (2000).
Notes: All amounts are percentages. The funds’ remaining assets comprise dues from the sale of securi-
ties, cash resources, and investments below 1 percent of the value of assets. In addition, the following
funds have invested assets in enterprise shares: Bankowy, 0.30 percent; PBK Orzeł, 3.74 percent; Pekao/
Alliance, 1.92 percent; and Winterthur, 4.34 percent.
Poland: Security through Diversity 357see table 11.4). However, such a move would not serve to reduce pension
purchasing power. If reform restores solvency to the pension system and
increases and consolidates economic growth—both indirectly (instead of
ﬁnancing the deﬁcit of the Social Insurance Institution, budgetary re-
sources would be used for structural policy and the creation of new jobs)
and directly (through greater savings, a better ﬁnancial capital structure,
and thus a higher level of investment)—then a lower replacement rate will
in future guarantee higher beneﬁts than at present.
Because the main cause of crisis in the majority of post-socialist coun-
tries is not (for the time being) demography but a poorly managed PAYGO
system, it is important to ask whether this system can be prepared and
radical reform avoided. Theoretically, this is possible. Rationalizing and
regulating the PAYGO system would restore long-term ﬁnancial stability
to the system. The problem could thus be adequately solved by raising the
retirement age, eliminating occupational privileges, and abolishing early
retirement.
This is how things look from a strictly ﬁnancial point of view. From a
political perspective, however, implementing such a program does not
seem possible, for two reasons. First, it would challenge the vested interests
of major social groups—in Poland, proposals to rationalize the present
system sparked serious social protest and became a highly sensitive politi-
cal issue. Second, the PAYGO system is by nature susceptible to political
manipulation—certain groups can be guaranteed privileges at the expense
of others because the relationship between contributions and beneﬁts is
unclear and ambiguous. The social insurance contribution is a collective
tax and not a form of individual saving. Few people are aware of being
insured, and thus the system lacks an institutionalized social force that
could defend the interests of the younger generation who are inconve-
nienced by privileges that politicians ﬁnd it more expedient to grant to
older generations. In such a situation, politicians will always be tempted
by moral hazard and will secure the votes of the large and active pensioner
electorate by granting them undue privileges.
Polish experience in this area furnishes one example that should serve
as a warning. Despite the acceptance by Parliament and government of
plans for a new and universal pension system, attempts to exclude two
inﬂuential legal groups from this system—judges and procurators—failed
under pressure of political and parliamentary lobbying. The legal lobby
had created a dangerous precedent. A new privilege was introduced, which
limited the possibility of cutting back on existing privileges.
If, however, for doctrinal, practical, and political reasons a mixed sys-
tem with a large PAYGO pillar is introduced (as in Poland), then the sys-
tem can be protected from its natural susceptibility to political manip-
ulation by individualizing social insurance, such as through a notional
deﬁned contribution (NDC). Individualizing social insurance can prevent
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.permanent decay of the PAYGO system. Moreover, for society at large
individualization is both desirable and understandable.
Ad i ﬃcult problem that needs to be addressed is the size of the second,
fully funded pillar. Because members of younger age groups transfer part
of their contributions to individual accounts in pension funds, the deﬁcit
in the PAYGO system is increasing. From this point of view it would be
sensible to limit the number of people obliged or entitled to participate in
the second pillar and reduce the size of the contribution assigned to this
pillar. On the other hand, the operation of the pension funds entails spe-
ciﬁc costs that are undoubtedly higher than in the case of the PAYGO
system. If there is only a small number of participants in these funds and
they must cover the costs, this will considerably limit the size of accumu-
lated capital and beneﬁt payments. From this point of view, it would be
necessary to do the opposite: to increase the number of participants in the
second pillar as well as the level of contributions transferred to pension
funds.
The choice must depend on the method adopted to ﬁnance the addi-
tional gap that will appear in the PAYGO pillar when the fully funded
pillar is launched. In Poland, this ﬁscal gap—which should not be con-
fused with the costs of reform—will be covered from current privatization
revenue.4 This is still possible due to the large amount of suitable state
treasury assets that have not yet been privatized. At the same time, the
capital market is suﬃciently advanced (i.e., relatively large and eﬃciently
regulated) to increase the scope of privatization and secure appropriately
high revenues.
The “delayed” privatization in Poland (due to societal resistance to this
process) turns out to have brought a signiﬁcant, although to some extent
accidental, beneﬁt: The state treasury assets can now be used to support
the pension system reform. This also accounts for the altered social per-
ception of privatization, which no longer stirs up much controversy and is
approved of by the greater part of society.
Privatization revenues appear an ideal source from which to ﬁnance the
additional transitional ﬁscal gap within the pension system caused by its
reform (see ﬁg. 11.1). The direct use of these funds to oﬀset the current
budget deﬁcit has the disadvantage of concealing the actual public-ﬁnance
imbalance and allowing excessive expenditure to continue. When this tran-
sient source of ﬁnancing eventually runs dry and cuts short the additional
4. As a result of introducing the mandatory fully funded pillar, an additional gap in the
social insurance funds will appear for a certain transitional period (lasting at least several
dozen years). In an economic sense, however, this is not an additional item of expenditure
or a new liability, but the replacement of one form of public debt (implicit debt) with another
(explicit debt). Consequently, the problem of liquidity becomes temporarily more acute
within the system, but additional costs do not emerge if this additional gap can be ﬁnanced
without increasing the current budget deﬁcit.
360 Jerzy Hausnerrevenue stream, ﬁscal adjustment may prove extremely diﬃcult and pain-
ful. To put it bluntly, rather than spend privatization revenues on con-
sumption, it is far more reasonable to use them to ﬁnance the historic
pension reform.
Another important factor is whether the economy in question is en-
joying economic growth. If it is not, it is diﬃcult to imagine obtaining
revenue from privatization, while the investments of pension funds might
not be suﬃciently eﬀective to ensure an increase in the capital of the parti-
cipants in investment funds.
It is evident from the above that multipillar pension reform cannot be
treated as a binding blueprint or a universal remedy. It is thus appropriate
only for those transition countries experiencing economic growth and hav-
ing a well-regulated capital market, a relatively balanced economy, and
controllable budget deﬁcits. Such countries should also have at their dis-
posal eﬃcient administrations capable of developing computerized infor-
mation systems to deal with individual insurance records and ensure the
swift and cheap transfer of contributions to pension funds and between
diﬀerent kinds of insurance. Ideally, they should also possess a large
amount of state assets suitable for privatization. It is only under such con-
ditions that a fully funded pillar will function, and only under such condi-
tions that its implementation will stimulate economic growth.
The opinions of economists vary on this issue, because empirical re-
search does not unequivocally conﬁrm that capital (funded) insurance re-
sults in an increase in domestic saving. Even leaving aside arguments
about the expected increase in domestic saving (which cannot be proved),
it can be clearly shown that multipillar pension reform will accelerate eco-
nomic growth as a result of changes in the capital structure. The establish-
ment of pension funds is one of the relatively few fast-track methods of
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Fig. 11.1 Subsidy from the state budget to the social security fund (FUS)
Source: Chlon and Wo ´ycicka (1999).long-term capital development in transition economies. Their appearance
on a large scale will undoubtedly help reduce interest rates and thus invest-
ment costs, and as a consequence accelerate economic growth.
Currently, pension funds manage assets worth $US 750 million. Increas-
ingly, they are investing these assets on the Warsaw Stock Exchange,
which, in the opinion of many experts, contributed to the very sharp in-
crease in share prices at the turn of 1999 to 2000. The Warsaw Stock Ex-
change index easily surpassed its record level from 1994. It is estimated
that by 2005 the funds will be managing resources worth $US 4 billion and
will become the largest investors on the Polish capital market.
The legislative framework of pension reform in Poland is still awaiting
completion. So far, no attempt has been made to reform the separate pen-
sion system for farmers, which is managed by the Farmers’ Social Insur-
ance Fund (KRUS). This system is subsidized almost entirely from the
state budget, at a level of 2 percent of GDP, and encompasses more than
2 million people.
In addition, the government has been unable to complete the very
diﬃcult negotiations over bridging pensions, which relate to early retire-
ment for those who work in special conditions that may adversely aﬀect
health, or who perform physically and psychologically demanding work
of a special character in the interests of public safety. Bridging pensions
should be granted for the period between the earlier age at which working
career ends and the minimum retirement age. Also needed is an annuity
companies law, and a national actuary law that would establish a national
actuarial oﬃce to supervise the long-term solvency of all social insurance
programs.
The legislation on employee pension programs is not working, in prac-
tice. There have been very few applications to establish such programs,
and the UNFE has dealt with them in a drawn-out and bureaucratic man-
ner. Experts believe that in the light of experience to date, the legislation
on employee pension programs should be amended. A private member’s
bill to amend the law was submitted to Parliament in the spring of 1999,
but it is still in the process of being examined by a parliamentary commis-
sion. In actual fact, therefore, one of the pillars of the new system has so
far not begun to function. This is signiﬁcant to the extent that the reform
envisaged a reduction in the replacement rate within the mandatory pillars
and the establishment of attractive possibilities for additional voluntary
insurance, ensuring a signiﬁcant increase in the replacement rate for per-
sons with high and medium incomes.
The initial reform project assumed a signiﬁcant change in the retirement
age. Formally, this age is sixty for women and sixty-ﬁve for men; in prac-
tice, it is roughly ﬁfty-ﬁve for women and ﬁfty-nine for men. The project
envisaged the introduction of an elastic retirement age, which would in
fact have been standardized for men and women—sixty-two in each case.
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public protest and under pressure from its Catholic faction, which, for
ideological reasons, primarily attributes a family-oriented role to women.
However, the retirement-age issue will certainly be debated again soon, for
an actuarially fair beneﬁt formula increases incentives to postpone retire-
ment decisions (Chlon, Go ´ra, and Rutkowski 1999, 19). At the same time,
the introduction of this formula and the maintenance of a lower retirement
age for women will mean that the beneﬁts received by women will be sig-
niﬁcantly lower than those received by men, which will be seen as discrimi-
nation.
Currently, the main problem with pension reform in Poland is the orga-
nizational ineﬃciency of the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS) and the
fact that this institution has failed to set up a comprehensive, computer-
ized information system. The ﬁrst and second pillars cannot operate with-
out such a system, for it is then impossible to maintain individual ac-
counts. The pension companies estimate that by the end of 1999 the Social
Insurance Institution had transferred barely 50 percent of contributions
to them, and that about 40 percent of members’ accounts are dormant
(i.e., not a single contribution has been paid in). Clearly, the problems of
the Social Insurance Institution will not be resolved quickly. The new head
of ZUS, appointed at the end of 1999, believes that resolution will be pos-
sible at the end of 2000 at the earliest. The ineﬃciency of ZUS also led to
a major decrease in the contribution collection rate in 1999. Consequently,
ZUS has run up an additional large deﬁcit, which for the moment has been
ﬁnanced from bank credits; sooner or later, however, the taxpayer will have
to foot the bill.
The example of the Social Insurance Institution clearly shows the extent
to which reform of the pension system is dependent on the eﬃciency of
the public administration. In Poland, the eﬃciency of the administration
is still very low and is further decreased by the practice of ﬁlling key public
positions according to political (party) criteria. This practice is also re-
sponsible for the poor functioning of the Social Insurance Institution and
the Pension Fund Supervisory Board, two key public institutions on whose
eﬃciency the success of pension reform rests.
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